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INTRODUCTION
A stochastic game is played in stages. At every stage the game is in some state of the world, and each player, given the whole history (including the current state), chooses an action in his action space. The action combination that was chosen by all players, together with the current state, determines This view, that in some states players play for high daily payoffs and in other states they play for good future opportunities, highlights the importance of recursive games in the study of general stochastic games.
For stochastic games with more than two players, very little is known. Even though some special classes were solved (see, e.g., Solan, 1999; Solan and Vieille, 1998) , proving, or disproving, the existence of equilibrium payoffs in general seems a daunting task. We study here the existence of correlated equilibrium payoffs in n-player stochastic games.
Correlation devices were introduced by Aumann (1974 Aumann ( , 1987 . A correlation device chooses for every player a private signal before the start of play and sends to each player the signal chosen for him. Each player can base his choice of an action on the private signal that he has received.
For multi-stage games, various generalizations of correlation devices have been introduced (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . (i) The most general device receives at every stage some private message from each player. It then chooses for each player a private signal for that stage (communication device; Forges, 1986 Forges, , 1988 Myerson, 1986; Mertens, 1994) . (ii) The most restricted device chooses, as in the case of one-shot games, one private signal before the start of play (correlation device; Forges, 1986) . (iii) In between, there are devices that choose private signals at every stage, but base their choice only on the current state (weak correlation devices; Nowak, 1991) or only on previous signals (autonomous correlation devices; Forges, 1986) . Solan (2000) proved that every feasible and individually rational payoff in a stochastic game is a correlated equilibrium payoff, where the correlation device chooses at every stage a signal that depends on the previous signal. However, he leaves open the question whether there exists a feasible and individually rational payoff.
In the present paper we study two types of correlation devices: (i) stationary devices that choose at every stage a signal according to the same probability distribution, independent of any data, and (ii) autonomous devices that base their choice of new signal on the previous signal, but not on any other information.
We prove two results: (a) Every stochastic game admits a correlated equilibrium, using an autonomous correlation device. The equilibrium path is sustained using threat strategies, in which players punish a deviator by his min-max value. This means that players need not correlate in the punishment phase. Moreover, punishment occurs only if a player disobeys the recommendation of the device. (b) If the game is positive recursive, then the correlation device can be taken to be stationary.
Both proofs utilize various methods that appeared in the literature. For general stochastic games, we first construct a "good" strategy profile, meaning a profile that yields all players a high payoff, in which no player can profit by a unilateral deviation that is followed by an indefinite punishment. The construction uses the technique of Mertens and Neyman (1981) .
We then follow Solan (2000) and define a correlation device that mimics that profile: the device chooses for each player an action according to the probability distribution given by the profile and recommends that each player play that action. To make deviations nonprofitable, the device reveals to all players the recommendations in the previous stage. This way, a deviation is detected immediately and can be punished. In particular, the device that we construct is not canonical (Forges, 1988) .
For positive recursive games we use a variant of the technique of Vieille (2000c) . We define for every ε > 0 a continuous function from the space of fully mixed strategy profiles into itself that should be thought of as an approximate best reply. This function has a fixed point, and by studying the asymptotic behavior of the sequence of fixed points we are able to define a simple stationary correlation device that induces a correlated equilibrium.
Even though our proofs use many known techniques, from Mertens and Neyman (1981) to Vieille (2000b Vieille ( , 2000c and Solan (2000) , the paper is self-contained, and no acquaintance with this literature is assumed.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the main results. After some preliminaries in Section 3 we describe the correlation devices that are used, and we give sufficient conditions for the existence of autonomous and stationary correlated equilibrium payoffs. In Section 4 we prove that every stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff, and in Section 5 we prove that every positive recursive game admits a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff.
THE MODEL AND THE MAIN RESULTS
A stochastic game G is given by (i) a finite set of players N, (ii) a finite set of states S, (iii) for every player i ∈ N, a finite set of available actions A i (we denote A = × i∈N A i ), (iv) a transition rule q S × A → S , where S is the space of all probability distributions over S, and (v) a daily payoff function r S × A → R N . We assume w.l.o.g. that r ≤ 1. The game lasts for infinitely many stages. The initial state s 1 is given. At stage n, the current state s n is announced to the players. Each player i chooses an action a i n ∈ A i ; the action combination a n = a i n i∈N is publicly announced, s n+1 is drawn according to q · s n a n , and the game proceeds to stage n + 1.
A state s in a stochastic game is absorbing if q s s a = 1 for every a ∈ A. We denote by S * the subset of absorbing states.
We denote by G n and G λ the games with strategy sets i i∈N and payoff functions γ n and γ λ , respectively. Definition 2.2. A payoff vector γ ∈ R S×N is a (uniform) autonomous (resp. stationary) correlated equilibrium payoff if for every ε > 0 there exists an autonomous (resp. stationary) correlation device and a profile σ in such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. There exists a finite horizon n 0 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n 0 , σ is an ε-equilibrium in the game G n with length n and
2. There exists λ 0 ∈ 0 1 such that for every λ ∈ 0 λ 0 , the profile σ is an ε-equilibrium in the game G λ and
Note that for every ε > 0 a different correlation device may be used. It is known that Conditions 1 and 2 in the above definition are equivalent. We shall deal with the former one.
The main result of the paper is:
Theorem 2.3. Every stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff.
The equilibrium path is sustained by threat of punishment by the minmax value, and a player is punished only if he disobeys the recommendation of the device.
When the game is positive and recursive, one can find a correlated equilibrium payoff where the device is stationary:
Theorem 2.4. Every positive recursive game admits a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff, where the correlation device is independent of ε.
In spite of the fact that the device is independent of ε, the profile that is used by the players does depend on ε.
THE CORRELATION DEVICES
The purpose of this section is to obtain sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of autonomous and stationary correlated equilibrium payoffs.
Preliminaries
The mixed extension of q to S × × i∈N A i is still denoted by q. The transition in state s for a mixed action x is denoted by q · s x or q s x .
For every finite set K and every probability distribution µ ∈ K , µ k is the probability of k under µ. Any element k ∈ K is identified with the probability distribution in K that assigns probability 1 to k. For any probability measure µ and real valued function u defined over S, we denote by µu = s∈S µ s u s the expectation of u under µ.
Denote by H n = S × A n−1 × S the space of all histories of length n in G and denote by H = ∪ n∈N H n the space of all finite histories. H ∞ = S × A N is the space of all infinite histories. We identify the space of histories of length 1, H 1 , with the state space S. For every finite history h ∈ H, s h denotes its last state.
A strategy of player i in G is a function
In general, the symbol τ denotes a profile in G,τ denotes a correlated profile in G, and σ denotes a profile in an extended game G . Stationary strategies of player i are strategies that depend only on the current state and not on previous signals, states, or actions. Thus, a stationary strategy of player i can be identified with an element x i = x i s s∈S ∈ A i S , with the understanding that x i s is the lottery used by player i to select his action in state s. We define X i = A i S to be the set of stationary strategies of player i, X = × i∈N X i to be the set of stationary profiles, and X −i = × j =i X i to be the set of stationary profiles of players N\ i . In particular, for every x ∈ X, every s ∈ S, and every u S → R, q s x u = s ∈S q s s x u s is the expectation of u under q · s x . Every finite history h ∈ H and every correlated profileτ in G induce a probability measure P h τ over H ∞ -the measure induced byτ in the subgame starting after the history h. The corresponding expectation operator is denoted by
n , c ≥ c if and only if c i ≥ c i for every i = 1 n.
The Min-Max Value
For every correlated profileτ, every history h ∈ H m , and every n ∈ N define
that is, the expected average payoff in the first n stages following the history h.
For every player i and every initial state s let v i s be the min-max value of player i at state s in G. That is, v i s is the unique real number such that for every ε > 0 there exists n 0 ∈ N and a (non-correlated) profile τ −i i ε of players N\ i that satisfy for every strategy τ i of player i γ i n s τ
and for every profile τ −i of players N\ i there exists a strategy τ i of player i that satisfies
Thus, up to an ε, players N\ i can lower the expected payoff of player i down to v i s , but they cannot lower it any more. The profile τ −i i ε is an ε-punishment profile against player i.
For every λ ∈ 0 1 let v i λ s be the λ-discounted min-max value of player i. Using the method of Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) Mertens and Neyman (1981) for two-player stochastic games, and Neyman (1988) , using the same method, proved in an unpublished paper that the result holds for n-player games.
An Autonomous Correlation Device

Mimicking a Strategy
In this section we define for every correlated profileτ in G two autonomous correlation devices. The first device 1 = 1 τ mimics the profileτ. That is, at stage n it sends to each player a vector of actions, one for every history of length n. The action combination for history h is chosen according toτ h .
The second device 2 = 2 τ is an augmentation of 1 . In addition to sending recommendations, the device reveals its recommendations from the previous stage. This way all players can compare the realized actions of each player to the recommended action and detect deviations.
We shall now define formally these two devices. 
In words, since m i n is a vector of actions, one for each possible history, in σ i 0 , player i plays the action that corresponds to the realized history. The probability measure P s τ over H ∞ coincides with the marginal probability measure induced by P 1 s σ 0 over H ∞ . We say that the device 1 mimics the profileτ.
We now define a second autonomous correlation device
n and M n−1 are the sets defined for 1 ). Denote the signal at stage n bym n = m n m n ∈ M n × M n−1 N . We define Note that the marginal probability measure P 2 s σ 0 over H ∞ coincides with the probability measure P s τ , where σ 0 is the analogue of (1) in G 2 .
Remark.
4
The procedure used here in defining 1 shows that every correlation device can be considered as an autonomous (but not necessarily canonical) correlation device.
The Sufficient Condition
Definition 3.2. Let γ = γ h h∈H be a function defined on finite histories with values in R N and letτ be a correlated profile. Average payoffs underτ converge to γ if lim n→∞ γ n h τ = γ h , uniformly in h.
In words, in every subgame the sequence of average payoffs induced bỹ τ has a limit (which may depend on the subgame).
For every correlated probability distribution y ∈ A , every player i ∈ N, and every action a = a −i a i ∈ supp y define y a i ∈ A −i to be the conditional probability distribution induced by y, given that the action chosen for player i is a i . Formally,
Note that since a ∈ supp y , the denominator does not vanish. In particular, for every correlated profileτ and every finite history h ∈ H τ h a i is the conditional probability over A −i , given that the action chosen for i is a i .
Definition 3.3. Let ε > 0, and let γ = γ h h∈H ∈ R N H be a function that assigns to every finite history a payoff vector. A correlated profileτ is ε-individually rational with respect to γ if for every stage n ∈ N, every history h n ∈ H n of length n, every action combination a = a i i∈N ∈ supp τ h n , every player i ∈ N, and every action
In words, a correlated profileτ is ε-individually rational if given any finite history h n , any player i who knows the action recommended to him and should choose between the following two alternatives, (i) play the recommended action and get the payoff defined by γ or (ii) play any action b i and be punished at the min-max level, cannot profit more than ε in any sufficiently long game by choosing the latter. Proof. This theorem is a weaker version of Proposition 4.6 in Solan (2000) . We provide here a sketch of the proof.
We construct an autonomous correlation device in the following manner. At every stage the device recommends an action to each player and reveals to each player the actions that it recommended to all the players at the previous stage. This way, a deviation of any player is detected immediately by all other players and can be punished with the min-max value.
Fix ε > 0, and let γ = γ ε andτ satisfy the conditions for this ε. Consider the autonomous correlation device = 2 τ that was defined in Section 3.3.1. The device sends at every stage n a vector of signals for every player: (i) for every history h ∈ H n a recommended action a i h and (ii) the vector of signals it sent to all the players at stage n − 1.
Define a profile σ in the extended game G as follows. After history h of length n, player i plays:
• If no deviation was ever detected, play the recommended action a i (h).
• For every player j, compare his realized action from the previous stage a j n−1 to the recommendation of the device a j h , where h is the n → 1-prefix of h. If some player j has deviated from the recommendation, switch to the punishment strategy τ i j ε forever. If more than one player deviated at the same stage, ignore this deviation.
The marginal probability measure P s σ over H ∞ coincides with P s τ . Hence γ i n h σ = γ i n h τ . Since average payoffs underτ converge to γ, there exists n 1 ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n 1 and every finite history h ∈ H,
Sinceτ is ε-individually rational and if a player disobeys the recommendation of the device he is punished by his min-max value, it follows that for every n ≥ n 0 + n 1 , where n 0 is defined in the definition of the min-max value in Section 3.2, and for every
Finally, for every ε let γ ε ∈ R S×N be defined by γ ε s = γ ε s . By (3) and (4), every accumulation point of the family γ ε , as ε goes to 0, satisfies condition 1 of Definition 2.2; hence it is a correlated equilibrium payoff. Since the state space is finite, such an accumulation point exists.
Stationary Correlation Device
In this section, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of stationary correlated equilibrium payoffs. This requires a more detailed analysis of the structure of the game. The condition we present is stated for general stochastic games; however, we can only prove that it is satisfied for positive recursive games.
Communicating Sets
Let x ∈ X be a stationary profile. The stationary profile y ∈ X is a perturbation of x if supp x i s ⊆ supp y i s for every player i ∈ N and every state s ∈ S.
A set C ⊂ S is stable under x if q C s x = 1 for every s ∈ C. The set is communicating under x if for every state s ∈ C there exists a perturbation y of x such that C is stable under y and
This is a property of the support of y. In particular, y can be chosen arbitrarily close to x. Let y C x ε s be such a perturbation that satisfies y C x ε s − x < ε. This definition captures the idea that the players can reach any state in C from any other state in C by slightly perturbing the stationary profile x.
We denote by x the collection of all the sets that communicate under x. Whenever we say that a communicating set C ∈ x is maximal, we mean maximal w.r.t. set inclusion. It is not difficult to check (and, since we do not use this property, left to the reader) that maximal communicating sets are disjoint.
On Exits
Let x ∈ X be a stationary profile and let C ∈ x be a communicating set under x.
Thus, an exit is a way that enables the players to leave a communicating set by slightly perturbing the profile x.
For simplicity, we sometimes write e = s a L when no confusion may arise. The set of all exits from C w.r.t.
is the subset of players that need to perturb. If L e = i , we say that e is a unilateral exit of player i. Otherwise, e is a joint exit. We sometimes write q e instead of q s x
For any subset C ⊂ S we define the exit stage from C by
This is the first stage in which the game is not in C. Every probability distribution over exits µ ∈ E x C defines a natural probability distributionμ over the states in S\C:
A profile τ in G is an ε-perturbation of a stationary profile x if for every finite history h ∈ H τ h − x < ε.
The following simple lemma is an immediate consequence of the definition of a communicating set.
Lemma 3.6. Let C ∈ x be a communicating set and let ε > 0. There exists a profileτ =τ C x ε in G such that 1.τ is an ε-perturbation of x.
For every exit e = s a
L and every n ∈ N,
Recall that h m is the finite history up to stage m, and s m is the last state of this history. In words, the second condition means that for every exit there are infinitely many stages where the play visits s and the players play the mixed action combination x s .
The profileτ is defined in rounds. At each round, the players play the following for every exit s j a L j j ∈ E x C : (a) Play the stationary profile y C x ε s j until the play reaches s j .
(b) At s j , play x s j .
It is easy to verify thatτ satisfies the requirements.
We use Lemma 3.6 to prove that any exit distribution from a communicating set can be induced by some strategy profile.
Lemma 3.7. Let a communicating set C ∈ x , let a probability distribution over exits µ ∈ E x C , and let ε > 0 be given. There exists a profile
2. P s τ s e C = s =μ s for every s ∈ C; that is, the probability distribution of the first state out of C that the play visits coincides withμ, whereμ is given by 5 .
. Let δ ∈ 0 ε be sufficiently small, and let δ 1 δ J satisfy for each j (i) δ j ∈ 0 δ and (ii) δ j = δ j−1 / 1 − δ j−1 µ j−1 .
Consider the strategy that was defined in the proof of Lemma 3.6, but replace (b) with:
Thus, if, for example, s 1 = s 2 = s, the players follow a strategy that leads the game to s 1 = s, at s they use the exit a L 1 1 with low probability, then they follow a strategy that leads the game to s 2 = s, where they use the exit a L 2 2 with low probability, and so on. If δ is sufficiently small then condition 1 holds. Let p j be the probability that exit s j a L j j is the first exit to be played. If the players follow τ then the ratio p j /p j−1 is
It follows that condition 2 holds.
Let µ ∈ E x C be a probability distribution over exits that is supported by unilateral exits, and let i ∈ N be a player. Assume that µ e > 0 for some unilateral exit e of player i, and let λ i be the induced probability distribution over the unilateral exits of player i. By the construction of τ andτ we have
Note that this equality holds since in the definition of τ i C x ε µ we listed all exits in E x C , rather than only those in supp(µ).
Let x be a stationary profile and let = C 1 C K T be a partition into disjoint communicating sets under x and the set T of remaining transient states under x. For every k = 1 K let µ k ∈ E x C k . Recall that by (5) each µ k defines a probability distributionμ k over S\C k . The triplet x µ k k defines a natural Markov chain over the state space S as follows. Transitions from states in some C k are defined byμ k , whereas transitions from transient states s ∈ T are defined by x s . Formally,
The Sufficient Condition
Recall that S is the subset of absorbing states.
Proposition 3.8. Let γ ∈ R N×S be a payoff vector and let x ∈ X be a stationary profile. Let
x for every k = 1 K and every s ∈ T is transient w. r.t. x. Assume that for every k = 1 K there exists a probability distribution µ k over E x C k such that the following conditions hold:
1. The Markov chain over S induced by x µ k k is absorbing; that is, the probability that the Markov chain eventually reaches an absorbing state is 1.
For every state s and every player
3. γ 
At least one of the following holds:
(a) For every player i, if e ∈ E x C k is a unilateral exit of player i with µ k e > 0, then q e γ i = γ i s for every s ∈ C k . (b) For every exit e ∈ E x C k , if µ k e > 0 then e is a unilateral exit of some player.
7.
If e 1 e 2 ∈ E x C k are two unilateral exits of player i such that µ k e 1 > 0, then q e2 γ ı ≤ q e 1 γ i ≤ γ ı s for every s ∈ C k . Then γ is a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff.
Let us first explain the main ideas of the proof and the role of each of the conditions.
The payoff vector γ is our desired correlated equilibrium payoff. We will construct a strategy τ where the players play x s in any transient state s ∈ T , and the exit distribution from each communicating set C k isμ k .
By condition 5 it follows that γ s is constant in every set C k . We denote this common value by γ C k .
Condition 1 will imply that some absorbing state is reached in finite time. Conditions 2(a) and 5 say that the sequence γ s n is a martingale in the induced Markov chain, and condition 3 says that it coincides with the absorbing payoff in absorbing states; hence the expected payoff by τ is indeed γ.
Let us now check where players can profit by unilaterally deviating from τ and where the correlation device is required.
Condition 4 asserts that γ is above the min-max level. By condition 2(b) no player can increase his continuation payoff by deviating in transient states; hence in those states players do not need a correlation device.
Once the play enters a communicating set C k , no player can increase his continuation payoff by playing a unilateral exit that is not in the support of µ k . This fact holds for players who have unilateral exit in supp(µ k ) by condition 7 and for the other players by condition 2(b).
In a communicating set C k that satisfies condition 6(a), players are indifferent to their unilateral exits that have positive probability under µ. In such a case, players do not need any correlation device to control the exit distribution from C k . Indeed, one possible definition of τ is to let the players follow τ C k x ε µ k until the play leaves C k . By condition 6(a) no player can profit by deviating at stages in which he should use one of his unilateral exits. Moreover, the players can monitor the behavior of their opponents in stages in which joint exits should be used by using standard statistical tests. This idea was used by Vieille (2000c, Proposition 7) in the setup of two-player recursive games and by Solan (1999, Lemma 5.3) in the setup of n-player absorbing games. Both proofs extend to the present case.
We are left with communicating sets C k that satisfy condition 6(b); that is, the exit distribution is supported by unilateral exits. This is the only case where correlation between the players is required. The role of the correlation device will be to choose one player and inform him that he should use one of his unilateral exits from C k . The other players will receive a signal that tells them not to use any of their unilateral exits. Since the game is positive the chosen player cannot profit by not using any of his unilateral exits. By condition 7 all of his unilateral exits that have positive probability under µ k yield him the same expected continuation payoff; hence he cannot profit by altering the probabilities in which he should use the different unilateral exits. By condition 7 the expected continuation payoff of any player i that was not chosen is at least γ i C k ; hence he cannot increase his expected continuation payoff by using one of his unilateral exits.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be fixed. Let K ⊂ 1 K be the subset of indices k for which C k satisfies condition 6(b). For every k ∈ K let α i k be the sum of µ k e over all unilateral exits e of player i. By condition 6(b),
Define a stationary correlation device = M i i∈N d as follows. The signal space of player i is M i = 0 1 K ; that is, for every set k ∈ K , every player receives a signal either 0 or 1. The product signal space is M = i∈N M i = 0 1 N K . At every stage the device chooses for each k ∈ K one player, according to the probability distribution α k = α i k . Each player i then receives a signal in M i , where the kth coordinate is 1 if i was chosen for C k and 0 otherwise. Formally, d = ⊗ k∈K d k is a product distribution, where d k l i = α i k and l i ∈ M is defined by l i j = 1 if and only if i = j. Define a profile σ in the extended game G as follows.
• When the play is in a transient state s ∈ T , play x s .
• When the play enters a communicating set C k that satisfies condition 6(a), follow the profile τ C k x ε µ k until the play leaves C k .
• When the play enters (at stage n) a communicating set C k that satisfies condition 6(b), denote by i the unique player that received the signal 1 for the set C k at stage n. Player i plays the strategy τ i C k x ε µ k , and each player j = i follows the strategyτ C k x ε . By (6), the strategy that is played is τ C k x ε λ k i , where λ k i is the restriction of µ k over the unilateral exits of player i from C k .
Note that the device was used only in sets C k that satisfy condition 6(b), and only at stages where the play enters one of those sets.
Assume that the players follow σ in G . By Lemma 3.7 the exit distribution from each set C k that satisfies condition 6(a) isμ k , and by Eq. (6) the same holds when the set satisfies condition 6(b). By conditions 1, 2(a), 3, and 5, the expected payoff for the players is γ s , where s is the initial state.
By condition 1 the corresponding Markov chain is absorbing. Hence the expected number of visits to transient states or communicating sets is finite. Therefore, to prove that condition 1 of Definition 2.2 holds, that is, that no player can profit too much by deviating along the play, it is sufficient to prove that no player can profit too much by deviating in any transient state or during one visit to some communicating set.
We are now going to add statistical tests and punishment profiles to deter players from deviating.
(a) If a player plays an action that is not compatible with the above profile, all players switch to an ε-punishment profile against that player. Simultaneous deviations of several players are ignored.
By conditions 2(b) and 4, no player can profit by deviating at transient states.
We now concentrate on communicating sets C k that satisfy condition 6(a). Recall that the profile τ C k x ε µ k that was defined in the proof of Lemma 3.7 uses the constants δ and η j j . In every round of the strategy τ C k x ε µ k , each exit is used with probability O δ . By condition 6(a) no player can increase his expected continuation payoff by altering the probability in which he uses one of his unilateral exits. Thus, we assume that players do not deviate in such a way, and we have to deal only with joint exits.
For these joint exits, we add the following tests:
(b) For each exit s j a L j j , each player i ∈ N is checked after many rounds that the distribution of his realized actions whenever the play was in s j is ε-close to x i s . (c) For each exit s j a L j j , each player i ∈ L j is checked whether he plays the action a i j with frequency η j . Formally, after many visits to s j , the realized probability p that player i plays a i j at those stages where the play visits s j should satisfy
Two conditions have to be met for such tests to be both reliable and effective: to be reliable, the probability of false detection of deviation should be small, and to be effective, the probability that exit is used before the test is employed should be small even if the tested player deviates.
For test (b) to be reliable, it should be employed after a number of stages which is large compared to 1/x 1/ L j −ν , there exists r > 0 (independent of δ) such that the probability that an honest player i would play a i j until stage δ −ν more than rδ 1/ L j −ν times is smaller than ε. Thus, in test (c) player i is checked, in addition to the test mentioned above, whether the number of times he plays a i j until stage δ −ν is at most rδ 1/ L j −ν . This test is done only between the first and the δ −ν th visit to s j . The purpose of this additional test is to prevent player i from playing a i j too often prior to stage δ −ν , in the hope that exit occurs. Therefore it must be that, even if player i chooses to play a i j in rδ 1/ L j −ν stages, the probability that exit occurs prior to stage δ −ν is small. Whenever player i plays a i j , the probability that exit occurs is of the order δ 1−1/ L j . Thus, it is enough to choose ν < 1.
Finally, we turn our attention to communicating sets C k that satisfy condition 6(b). Note that in such a set, if α i k > 0 for at least three players, then no player except the chosen one knows who should use his unilateral exits.
Here only tests (a) and (b) are needed. Let i be the player who should use one of his unilateral exits. By condition 7 he is indifferent between his unilateral exits; hence he cannot profit by altering the probabilities with which he uses any of his unilateral exits. Moreover, he cannot profit by using a unilateral exit that has probability 0 under µ. Since the game is positive recursive, γ s ≥ 0, and 0 is the payoff player i will get if he does not use any of his unilateral exits. Thus player i cannot profit by deviating.
Consider now a player j = i. This player does not know which player got the signal 1. All he knows is that unless he deviates, none of his unilateral exits will be used. Since in those exits he receives by condition 7 at most γ j C k , his expected payoff conditioned on receiving the signal 0 is at least γ j C k . If player j deviates and uses one of his unilateral exits, his deviation will not be detected by anyone except player i. In particular, player j will not be punished (provided there are at least three players). The probability that players i and j will use one of their unilateral exits at the same stage is small; hence, by condition 7, the expected payoff of player j is at most γ j C k + ε.
GENERAL STOCHASTIC GAMES
In this section we prove Theorem 2.3. By Theorem 3.4 it is sufficient, given ε > 0, to find a vector γ = γ h h∈H of payoff vectors and a correlated profileτ in G that satisfy:
• Average payoffs underτ converge to γ.
•τ is ε-individually rational with respect to γ.
Using the method of Mertens and Neyman (1981) we construct for every ε > 0 a profile τ in G that is ε-individually rational. Unfortunately, we do not know whether average payoffs under τ converge. Using τ we define a correlated profileτ that is ε-individual rational and in some sense cyclic. The cyclic nature ofτ will ensure that average payoffs underτ converge.
A Mertens-Neyman Profile
The result of Mertens and Neyman (1981) can be summarized as follows. Let g 0 1 × S → R be a function with bounded variation, 5 let ε > 0 and let i ∈ N be a player. Since g has bounded variation, the limit g 0 = lim λ→0 g λ exists.
Recall that s h is the last state of the history h. Mertens and Neyman (1981) constructed for every n ∈ N and α > 0 a function λ i n H → 0 α that depends both on g and on ε . Assume that there is a profile τ in G that satisfies for every finite history h of length n, 
Recall that s h is the last state of the history h. Mertens and Neyman then prove that the following hold when the players follow τ:
(MN.1) λ i n converges to 0 with probability 1 (this fact will not be used here).
(MN.2) For every finite history h ∈ H of length m and every n ≥ m, E h τ g 0 s n ≥ g 0 s h − ε .
(MN.3) There exists n 0 ∈ N such that for every finite history h ∈ H,
Intuitively, for every discount factor λ and every state, the function g assigns some desired level for player i. If the profile τ guarantees that at any stage n the λ i n -level does not fall on average, then the expected payoff of player i is guaranteed to be at least g 0 − ε .
Recall that v i λ s s∈S is the λ-discounted min-max value of player i. For every state s ∈ S and every vector of discount factors λ = λ i i∈N , let G s λ be the one-shot game with (i) player set N, (ii) the action set of each player i is A i , and (iii) the payoff function is 
for every history h of length n. That is, at every stage the players play an equilibrium in the one-shot game G s λ , where each player calculates his discount factor separately. By construction we have 
which is the basic equation (8) needed by Mertens and Neyman. By (MN.2), (MN.3), and the choice of α, it follows that the profile τ is 3ε -individually rational w.r.t. v. 7 The main problem with this definition of τ is that we do not know whether average payoffs converge under τ.
Remark. Our definition of a correlated equilibrium payoff is a uniform one. Another possible definition is using the limsup of the daily payoffs; that is, a payoff vector γ ∈ R N×S is an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff in the limsup sense if for every ε > 0 there exists an autonomous correlation device and a strategy profile σ in G such that for every initial state s, every player i ∈ N, and every strategy σ i of player i,
where γ i s σ = E s σ lim sup n→∞ 1 n r i s 1 a 1 + · · · + r i s n a n Let τ be the strategy profile defined in (9), let = 2 τ be the device defined in Section 3.3.1, and let σ be the strategy profile in G that follows the recommendation of the device as long as no deviation is detected and punishes a deviator by his min-max level. Using (MN.2) and (MN.3), one can show that (11) holds.
Thus, the construction we presented here provides a simple proof for the existence of an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff in the limsup sense.
Modifying the Profile
The conclusion is that the profile τ needs to be modified, so that average payoffs under τ will converge. The goal of this section is to define a modification of τ, namely a correlated profileτ, that is individually rational and in which average payoffs underτ do converge.
One way to ensure that average payoffs converge is to have the profile cyclic.
A naive way to modify τ in a cyclic manner is to play τ by blocks of some length N 0 , namely, to forget the past history at the end of each block and to resume playing according to τ, as if the game was starting anew. Observe that the sequence of the initial states of the successive blocks follows a Markov chain. Average payoffs therefore converge, but it is not clear whether this profile is ε-individually rational. The reason for that is the following. The min-max value of the initial state may decrease a little from block to block, in expected terms, by at most ε . Since the past history is forgotten at the beginning of each block, errors may accumulate. Since Mertens and Neyman's result says only that the average payoff over any block is at least the min-max value of the first state in the block (up to ε , provided N 0 is large), we get no estimate on the average payoff received during course of the play.
The solution is to divide the state space into three disjoint subsets.
1. States s such that there exists a mixed action y that satisfies the following. If in state s the players play y, then (i) the expected continuation min-max value does not decrease, and (ii) there is a positive probability that the min-max value changes for at least one player. This set of states is denoted by S.
2.
States s where the probability to reach under τ during the first N 0 stages a state in S or to reach a state with a different min-max value is small. N 0 is sufficiently large to satisfy some conditions, including (MN.3). This set of states is denoted by S 1 .
3. The set of all remaining states, which is denoted by S 2 .
We defineτ as follows:
(a) Whenever the play visits a state s ∈ S, the players play a mixed action y that satisfies the condition (1) of the previous paragraph.
(b) Whenever the play reaches a state s ∈ S 2 , the players play for N 0 stages as they played in τ.
(c) Whenever the play visits a state s ∈ S 1 , the players play for N 0 stages almost as they played under τ. The modification is done to make the probability of reaching a state in S or of reaching a state with a different min-max value in the first N 0 stages vanish.
The idea behind this definition is the following. The fact thatτ and τ are close has two implications: underτ, (i) v s n would be almost a submartingale, and it will convergeτ-a.s., and (ii) the expected average payoff in the first N 0 stages is high (at least the min-max value). The first implication will be used to show that the min-max value changes only finitely many times along the play. One can then bound the number of visits to states in S and S 2 . In particular, from some point on, the play remains in S 1 , and the min-max value remains constant. The second implication will be used to show that once the play remains in S 1 , the expected average payoff is high (at least the min-max value).
Thus, each state s in S 1 has the following property: there exists a stationary correlated profile τ such that, provided the initial state is s, under τ , (i) the min-max level remains fixed, and (ii) the average expected payoff remains high. In particular, states in S 1 are easily solved: provided the initial state is in S 1 , one can construct a simple autonomous correlation device such that following the recommendation of the device is ε-optimal.
Two final points before we continue the formal proof. First, the set S will be larger than the one defined above. Second, to make sure thatτ is ε-individually rational, given the action chosen for i at state s, the conditional distribution over A −i should be close to x −i s λ , for some λ sufficiently small.
Partitioning the State Space
We start by identifying the set S. For every state s ∈ S define X * s to be the set of all accumulation points of x s λ :
Since the action sets are finite, X * s is non-empty and compact. Since x s λ is an equilibrium in the one-shot game G s λ , it follows that
In particular
We denote by C s = s ∈ S s.t. v s = v s the set of states where the min-max value is equal to the min-max value at s (for all players).
Define
Those are all the states where, by playing some mixed action in X * s , the min-max level changes with positive probability.
We can now define iteratively
Clearly S n+1 ⊇ S n , and since the state space is finite, there exists some n ≤ S such that S n+1 = S n .
8 Define S = ∪ S n=1 S n . Thus, from any state s ∈ S there is a positive probability that the min-max level will change during the first S stages after the play visits s, while the expected min-max level does not drop. By appropriately definingτ in S we will be able to bound the expected number of visits to those states.
From now on we fix ε > 0 sufficiently small. Since X * s was defined as the set of all accumulation points of sequences x s λ as λ goes to 0, there exists α 0 > 0 such that if λ ∈ 0 α 0 N then d x s λ X * s < ε d · · is the supremum distance .
By construction, for every s ∈ S q S\C s ∪ S s y = 0 ∀ y ∈ X * s
and
provided that α 0 is sufficiently close to zero. We now introduce the sets S 1 and S 2 that were mentioned in the above presentation. Take ε = ε N +1 × S+1 , and denote by τ the corresponding Mertens-Neyman's profile with α = α 0 . By (MN.2) and (MN.3) there exists an integer N 0 such that, for every state s ∈ S,
A state s is good if, starting from s, there is a small probability that under τ the min-max level changes or the play reaches a state in S in the first N 0 stages.
The set of good states is denoted by S 1 and we set S 2 = S\ S 1 ∪ S .
The Correlated Distance
The definition of individual rationality requires that given the action chosen for him, no player can gain by a deviation that is followed by punishment with his min-max level. To fulfill this requirement, the correlated strategyτ that we are going to define has to be close in some correlated sense to the set X * . We define this closeness concept now. Recall that for every correlated probability distribution y ∈ A and every a = a −i a i ∈ supp y y a i is the conditional probability over A −i , given that the action chosen for i is a i .
Definition 4.2. Let x y ∈ A with supp y ⊆ supp x . The correlated distance between y and x is defined by
This definition captures the difference in information players have when they know the action chosen for them under y, relative to the same action being chosen under x.
Note that if supp y ⊂ supp x , then d c x y is not defined. However, if supp y = supp x then d c y x = d c x y . Moreover, d c z y + d c y x ≥ d c z x whenever the two correlated distances on the left-hand side are defined.
Fix a state s ∈ S 1 , and call an action combination a bad if q S\C s ∪ S s a > 0. Those are actions that should not be played in good states. We now define for every mixed action y that gives low weight to bad actions a correlated mixed actionỹ that (i) is close to y in the correlated distance and (ii) gives probability 0 to bad actions.
A naive way to do it would be to normalize y over the non-bad actions. As the following example shows, this may lead to a large correlated distance; hence we may need to eliminate more actions.
Consider a 2 × 2 matrix where player 1 is the row player, player 2 is the column player, actions of player 1 are T B , and actions of player 2 are L R . Let y be the mixed profile where player 1 plays T with probability 1 − ε, player 2 plays L with probability 1 − ε, and the two play independently. If the action combination B R is the only bad action, definẽ
However, if the action combination B L is the only bad action and we
Thus, one has to eliminate also B R and defineỹ = 1 − ε T L + ε T R .
Let s ∈ S be a state. Define
to be the set of all bad actions. Define recursively
Clearly, the sequence B n is non-decreasing and hence eventually stationary. Denote by B ∞ the limit and observe that B A = B ∞ . In particular,
for any b ∈ B ∞ . We now define for every mixed action profile y a correlated probability distributionỹ that is close to y in the correlated distance and gives probability 0 to bad actions. Define
Finally,ỹ is the normalization of y if y A > 0 and arbitrary otherwise. Let ζ = min q s s a s s ∈ S a ∈ A q s s a > 0 be the minimal positive transition in the game.
Lemma 4.3. For every state s ∈ S 1 , every y ∈ i ∈ N A i such that q S\C s ∪ S s y ≤ ε, and every ε sufficiently small the following hold.
(i) y A > 0, so that the normalization is well defined.
Proof. To prove (i), note that the cardinality of B ∞ is at most A . Since q S\C s ∪ S s y ≤ ε, one has y b ≤ ε/ζ, for every b ∈ B 1 . By (17), y B ∞ ≤ A √ ε/ζ, and (i) follows. Let us now show that (ii) holds as well. Fix a player i ∈ N and an action combination a ∈ supp ỹ . Since a ∈ B ∞ , one has y a > y b /ε 1/ 2 A , for every b ∈ B ∞ .
In particular, by removing any b ∈ B ∞ from y, the conditional probability given a i does not change by more than ε 1/ 2 A . Since we remove at most A actions, d c ỹ y ≤ A ε 1/ 2 A . Finally, (iii) is immediate from the definitions of B 1 andỹ.
Definition ofτ
Let s 1 be a good state, and set C = C s 1 ∩ S\ S . We are now going to assign, for every history of length at most N 0 that starts in S 1 , a correlated probability distributionτ 1 h in A . We then show that underτ 1 (i) play remains in C, (ii) the correlated distance ofτ 1 h from some x s λ is small, and (iii) the average payoff in the first N 0 stages underτ 1 is at least
Let h be a finite history of length at most N 0 that starts in s 1 and visits only states in C. Defineτ 1 h =ỹ, where y = τ h .
For any other history h of length at most N 0 letτ 1 h = τ h . Let s ∈ S. Let n be the minimal integer such that s ∈ S n+1 . Let y s ∈ X * s satisfy q S\C s ∪ S n s y s > 0, where by convention S 0 = .
We are now ready to define the correlated profileτ. The profile is defined in blocks of different length-length 1 for states in S and length N 0 for all other states. Let s be the initial state of the current block. Then, regardless of the past play
• If s ∈ S, the players play y s .
• If s ∈ S 1 , the players followτ 1 for N 0 stages.
• If s ∈ S 2 , the players follow τ for N 0 stages.
As we show below, the correlated profileτ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.4.
Analysis ofτ
We first prove that if the play starts at S 1 , the average payoffs up to stage N 0 under τ andτ are close.
Lemma 4.4. For every s
Proof. Since s 1 is good, the probability that under τ the play leaves C in the first N 0 stages is at most ε. Thus, the probability that an action combination a ∈ B 1 is ever played before stage N 0 is at most ε/ζ. Therefore, the probability that under τ an action in B ∞ is ever played before stage N 0 is at most A √ ε/ζ.
Since the probability induced by τ over histories that never use bad actions coincides with the probability induced byτ over H N 0 , the set of histories of length N 0 , and since payoffs are bounded by 1, the result follows.
By construction, if s 1 ∈ S 1 then P s 1 τ s N 0 +1 ∈ C s 1 ∩ S\ S = 1. Lemma 4.4 and the choice of N 0 shows that
We now bound the number of visits to states in S 2 . Recall that from every s ∈ S there is a positive probability that if the players followτ the play leaves S in the first S stages. Let ω 1 be a positive lower bound of this probability for s ∈ S.
Define a transition function over the state space S by
Fix an initial state s, and denote for simplicity by s n the induced Markov chain over S. We denote by E p the corresponding expectation. By construction, If s n ∈ S E p v s n+1 s n ≥ v s n and p v S n+m = v s n ≥ ω 1 for some m ≤ S
If s n ∈ S 1 v s n+1 = v s n p-a.s.
If 
The expected number of visits to states in S 2 and S is at most
Proof. Note that (1) follows from (3), since by (3) no state in S 2 ∪ S can be in any ergodic subset.
Therefore, by (20), v s is constant in every ergodic subset. In particular, (2) follows.
Define the number of visits to S 2 ∪ S by
By (19), (20), and (21) we have
Therefore (4) follows from (3). Thus, to prove the lemma it is enough to prove (3). We proceed to get an upper bound on E p N . By (20), if s n ∈ S 1 then s n+1 ∼ s n . Eq. (19) implies that if s n ∈ S then P s n+m s n ≥ ω 1 ρ/ 1 + ρ > ε for some m ≤ S
Our next goal is to show that if s n ∈ S 2 then
Let i be the player with minimal index such that p v i s n+1 = v i s n ≥ ε N +1−i /2. By (21), p v s n+1 = v s n ≥ ε; hence such i exists. In particular,
Now, by (21), since payoffs are bounded by 1, and by the definition of ρ,
Using (25) one deduces that
Using v i s n ≥ 0 and ρ ≤ 1 we get that
Since for every player j < i p v j s n+1 = v j s n < ε N +1−j /2, it follows that
and (24) follows.
By (23) and (24) and since S 2 ∪ S ≤ S − 1 it follows that with probability at least ε N +1 × S , the states s n s n+1 s n+ S 2 include a state in S 1 .
Since s m+1 ∼ s m whenever s m ∈ S 1 3 follows.
We may now conclude the proof of Theorem 2.3. Sinceτ is defined by blocks, average payoffs underτ do converge uniformly over h. Denote the limit by γ = γ h h∈H .
By Lemma 4.5(1), any ergodic set w.r.t. p is a subset of S 1 , and therefore v s is constant in any such set. Fix a finite history h ∈ H. By (18), if s h is in an ergodic set under p, then γ h ≥ v s h − 2 A √ ε/ζ. By Lemma 4.5(4),
Finally, for any history h, the correlated distance betweenτ h and τ h is at most A ε 1/ 2 A . Since τ h = x s λ for some λ ∈ 0 α 0 N , it follows by (12) thatτ is 2 A ε 1/ 2 A -individually rational with respect to γ. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Remark. For simplicity, one can change the definition ofỹ so thatỹ is a non-correlated mixed action that satisfies Lemma 4.3. By a limit argument, one can show the existence of a solvable set in the sense of Vieille (1998) . Thus, our proof is an alternative proof for the existence of solvable sets in N-player stochastic games. 9 Actually, using the definition of S instead of (23) one can show that with probability at least ε N +1 × S one of the states s n s n+1 s n+ S −1 is in S 1 .
POSITIVE RECURSIVE GAMES
In this section we restrict ourselves to positive recursive games, and we prove Theorem 2.4. Actually we prove that if the game is positive recursive, then the conditions of Proposition 3.8 hold.
The method that we use is similar to the one used in Vieille (2000c) . For every ε > 0 we define a continuous function, which should be thought of as an approximate best reply, from a compact convex subset of the space of fully mixed stationary profiles into itself. This function has a fixed point x ε (which is a stationary profile) that yields the players a payoff vector γ ε . By studying the asymptotic behavior of the family x ε , we are able to show that the payoff vector lim γ ε satisfies the condition of Proposition 3.8 w.r.t. the stationary profile lim x ε .
We begin with some preliminary results, that are essentially a review of Vieille (2000b) . We then define for every ε > 0 a continuous function from the space of fully mixed stationary profiles into itself and study the asymptotic behavior of a sequence of fixed points.
Preliminaries
For every stationary profile x γ x = γ s x s∈S is the expected undiscounted payoff for the players if they follow x. A stationary profile x ∈ X is absorbing if for every initial state, the probability of reaching an absorbing state is 1, provided the players follow x.
For any stationary profile x ∈ X and pure action combination a ∈ A S we define x a = s∈S i∈N x i s a i s . It is of special interest to know how the distribution of exit from a set depends upon the (stationary) strategies used by the players.
For B ⊆ S\S , define a B-graph to be a set g of arrows s a → s , where s ∈ B a ∈ A s ∈ S, such that:
1. For each s ∈ B, there is a unique pair a s , such that s a → s ∈ g; moreover, q s s a > 0.
2. For each s ∈ B, there is a path s 0 a 0 → s 1 a 1 → · · · → s N , such that s = s 0 s N / ∈ B, and s n a n → s n+1 ∈ g.
The path in condition 2 is unique. We call it the g-path starting from s. Graphically, a B-graph is a collection of disjoint (directed) paths that end outside B, and visit all states in B.
G B is the set of B-graphs and, for every s ∈ B and every s / ∈ B G B s → s is the set of g ∈ G B , such that the g-path starting from s ends up in s .
For x ∈ X and g ∈ G B , we set w x g = s a→s ∈g x s a q s s a (26) w x g should be interpreted as the weight of g under x. Note that since B-graphs must not have cycles, g∈G B w x g need not be equal to 1.
Recall that e B = inf n ≥ 1 s n / ∈ B is the first exit stage from B. If B is transient under x e B < +∞ P s x -a.s. for every initial state s ∈ B.
For a state s ∈ B set Q s x s B = P s x s e B = s . This is the exit distribution from B; that is, the probability that if the initial state is s ∈ B and the players follow x, the first state that they visit outside B is s .
A very useful formula that relates Q s x to the weights of the B-graphs is the following (Freidlin and Wentzell, 1984, Chapter 6, Lemma 3.3 
Asymptotic Analysis
The main difficulty in the study of the uniform equilibrium is that the limit payoff γ s τ = lim n γ n s τ is not continuous over the strategy space. A classical approach in the study of the uniform equilibrium in n-player stochastic games is to define for every ε > 0 an ε-approximating game where the payoff function is continuous over the strategy space and moreover admits a stationary equilibrium x ε . By studying asymptotic properties of the sequence x ε one tries to understand the behavior of the play in the original stochastic game. In the results that appear in the literature, the function ε → x ε could always be chosen to be a Puiseux function (that is, it has an expansion to a Taylor series in fractional powers of ε) and therefore has useful properties.
In our proof this function need not have such an expansion; hence we must impose these properties in other ways.
For the rest of the section we fix a sequence x ε ε>0 of absorbing stationary profiles. From (27) and (26), one sees that relevant quantities to the calculation of the exit distribution are the ratios x ε a 1 /x ε a 2 , for a 1 a 2 ∈ A S . By taking a subsequence, we assume w.l.o.g. that supp x ε is independent of ε and
This implies that lim ε→0 x ε exists in X. Moreover, this limit depends only on θ a 1 a 2 a 1 a 2 and not on the exact sequence x ε . We denote this limit by x θ . One derives from (27) that lim ε→0 Q s x ε · B exists in S\B for every subset B ⊆ S\S . The limit is denoted by Q s θ · B .
It follows that lim ε→0 γ x ε exists. This limit is denoted by γ θ . Clearly γ θ need not be equal to γ x θ . Definition 5.1. A set C ⊆ S\S communicates under θ if Q s θ s C\ s = 1 for every s ∈ C and every s ∈ C\ s . This captures the property that, starting anywhere in C, the play visits "infinitely" many times every state in C before leaving this set as ε → 0 . Denote by θ the collection of sets which communicate under θ. Note that if C 1 C 2 ∈ θ are maximal w.r.t. set inclusion, then C 1 = C 2 or C 1 ∩ C 2 = . Indeed, assume that s ∈ C 1 ∩ C 2 , and let s 1 ∈ C 1 and
Since s 1 and s 2 are arbitrary, C 1 ∪ C 2 is communicating under θ. Since C 1 and C 2 are maximal, C 1 = C 2 .
The following two properties hold for every communicating set C ∈ θ :
1. The exit distribution Q s θ · C is independent of s ∈ C (Vieille, 2000b, Lemma 5). We denote this limit by Q θ · C .
2. C is communicating under x θ (Vieille, 2000b, Lemma 24) .
Let C ∈ θ and g = s a s → s s ∈ C be a C-graph. By (28) and (26), it follows that lim ε→0 w x ε g /w x ε g exists for every g g ∈ G C , but it may be equal to +∞. A graph g ∈ G C is maximal if lim ε→0 w ε g /w ε g < +∞ for every g ∈ G C . Intuitively, a graph g is maximal if there is no other graph that weighs "infinitely" more than g as ε → 0 . We now relate the exit distribution Q θ · C to the set of maximal graphs
−L θ a L be an exit from a communicating set C ∈ θ , and let g be a C-graph. We say that g uses e if g includes an arrow s a −L a L → s for some a −L ∈ supp x −L θ and some s / ∈ C. For every communicating set C ∈ θ define e C = inf n ≥ 1 s n a n ∈ E x θ C 10 Our definition of maximal graphs corresponds to minimal graphs in Vieille (2000b Vieille ( , 2000c . that is, the first stage that an exit is used. Since using an exit does not necessarily mean leaving C and since the play might leave C not through an exit, we cannot compare e C and e C . However, as ε goes to 0 the probability that the play leaves C through an exit converges to 1; hence lim ε→0 P s x ε e C ≤ e C = 1 ∀ s ∈ C
Eq. (29) implies that e C induces a probability distribution over the exits from C: for every exit e ∈ E x θ C µ θ C e is the limit of the probability that under x ε the first exit from C that is used is e.
As described earlier by (5), every probability distribution µ on exits E x θ C induces a probability distributionμ on the states outside C. One can verify thatμ θ C = Q θ · C .
It follows that an exit e = s a L from C has a positive probability in µ θ C (that is, µ θ C e > 0) if and only if there is a maximal C-graph g that uses e. In such a case it follows that the C\ s -graph g that is obtained from g by deleting the arrow s a → s is maximal. Indeed, otherwise there exists a maximal C\ s -graph g that satisfies lim ε→0 w x ε g /w x ε g = +∞. But then the C-graphg that is defined by adding the arrow s a → s to g satisfies lim ε→0 w x ε g /w x ε g = +∞, which contradicts the maximality of g.
Proof of Theorem 2.4
We assume w.l.o.g. that if x ∈ X is fully mixed then the only ergodic sets of the corresponding Markov chain are the absorbing states. If this was not true then, by turning all ergodic sets w.r.t. such x in S\S into absorbing states with payoff 0, one would get a game with the same set of correlated equilibrium payoffs and with the desired property.
We now prove Theorem 2.4. The proof goes as follows. The space of stationary profiles where each player must play any action with probability at least ε 2 is compact, and the undiscounted payoff is continuous over this space. For every ε > 0 sufficiently small we define a continuous function f from this space into itself. This map should be thought of as an approximate best reply. Since the function is continuous, it has a fixed point x ε . We define θ = θ a 1 a 2 as the limit (up to a subsequence) of To prove conditions 6 and 7 we need the following definitions. For every subset C ⊆ S and every C-graph g ∈ G C , define the overall cost of g by c g θ = i∈N s a→s ∈g c s a i θ
Since x ε is a fixed point of (31), it follows that if c g 1 θ < c g 2 θ then lim ε→0 w x ε g 1 /w x ε g 2 = lim ε→0 ε c g 1 θ −c g 2 θ = +∞. Note that if c g 1 θ = c g 2 θ , then we have no information on this limit.
For every communicating set C ∈ θ and every exit e = s a L from C define c e θ , the cost of the exit e, as the overall cost of a maximal C-graph that uses e (as the proof of Lemma 5.4 below shows, it is irrelevant which maximal C-graph is chosen).
Lemma 5.4. Let e 1 e 2 ∈ E x C k be two exits. If µ k e 1 µ k e 2 > 0, then c e 1 θ = c e 2 θ .
Proof. Let e 1 e 2 ∈ E x C k be two exits such that c e 1 θ < c e 2 θ . Let g 1 be a maximal C-graph that uses e 1 , and let g 2 be an arbitrary C-graph that uses e 2 . By assumption, c g 1 θ = c e 1 θ < c e 2 θ ≤ c g 2 θ , which implies that lim ε→0 w x ε g 1 /w x ε g 2 = +∞. Since g 2 is arbitrary the result follows.
Lemma 5.5. Let C ∈ θ be a communicating set and let s 0 ∈ C be arbitrary. There exists a C\ s 0 -graph g such that (i) every g-path ends at s 0 , and (ii) the overall cost of g is 0.
Proof. Since C ∈ θ , it follows that C ∈ x θ = x as well. Hence, under the stationary profile y C x ε s 0 the set C is stable and, starting from C, the play reaches s 0 in finite time.
It follows that there exists a graph g = s a s → s ∈ G C\ s 0 such that a i s belongs to the support of y i C x ε s 0 for every s ∈ C\ s 0 and every player i ∈ N. Indeed consider the directed graph (in the sense of graph theory) whose vertices are the states in C and includes the edge s → s if and only if there exists a mixed action combination a s ∈ supp y C x ε s 0 such that q s s a s > 0. Since from each vertex s there is a directed path to s 0 , it follows that there is a spanning tree with the same property. The spanning tree defines a natural C\ s 0 -graph g. Since g was defined by a spanning tree, any g-path ends at s 0 .
Since C is stable under y C x ε s , it follows that q C s x −i a i s = 1. Since γ θ is constant over C c s a i s θ = 0. Summing over all arrows in g we get c g θ = 0.
Corollary 5.6. Let C ∈ θ be a communicating set and let e ∈ E x C be an exit. If e is a joint exit then c e θ = 0, whereas if e = s a i is a unilateral exit then c e θ = γ s θ − q s x −i θ a i γ θ .
Proof. Let e = s a L be a joint exit. Then L ≥ 2. Let g be the C\ s -graph that satisfies Lemma 5.5 for s 0 = s. Let g be the C-graph that is defined by adding to g the arrow s a −L a L → s for some a −L ∈ supp x −L θ and s / ∈ C. Since L ≥ 2 q C s x −i θ a i = 1 for every i ∈ L. Since γ θ is constant on C c a i θ = 0 for every i ∈ L. It follows that c g θ = 0; hence c e θ = 0 as well.
Now let e = s a i be a unilateral exit. Any C-graph that uses e must have an arrow of the form s a −i a i → s for some a −i ∈ x −i θ and s / ∈ C. Hence the cost of any such graph is at least γ s θ − q s x −i θ a i γ θ . But as in the case of a joint exit, we can construct a C-graph that uses e and whose overall cost is exactly γ s θ − q s x −i θ a i γ θ , and therefore this is the cost of e.
We now show how Lemma 5.4 and Corollary 5.6 imply that conditions 6 and 7 hold.
If condition 6(b) does not hold then there is a joint exit e in supp µ k . By Corollary 5.6 c e θ = 0. By Lemma 5.4 c e θ = 0 for every exit e ∈ supp µ k , which by Corollary 5.6 establishes condition 6(a).
Condition 7 also follows. Let e 1 e 2 ∈ E x C k be two unilateral exits of player i such that µ k e 1 > 0. We will show that q e 2 γ i ≤ q e 1 γ i ≤ γ i C k
. By condition 2(b), q e 1 γ i ≤ γ i C k
. Assume to the contrary that q e 2 γ > q e 1 γ. Since γ is constant over C k , it follows by Corollary 5.6 that c e 2 θ < c e 1 θ . In particular, there exists a C k -graph g 2 that uses e 2 such that for every C k -graph g 1 that uses g 1 , lim ε→0 w ε g 2 /w ε g 1 = +∞, which implies that µ k e 1 = 0, a contradiction.
